State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace*

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Existing literature on state repression generally ignores the diversity that exists within autocracies. At present, different political systems are collapsed together, leaving unique approaches to political order unexamined. This limitation is important for policymakers, activists, and everyday citizens around the world seeking new ways to reduce government coercion. Within this study, the author explores an alternative path to decreasing repression – a ‘tyrannical peace’. Examining 137 countries from 1976 to 1996, he finds that single-party regimes are generally less repressive than other autocracies. Results also show that military governments decrease civil liberties restriction and the end of the Cold War has varied influences on repression, depending upon the form considered and whether this variable is interacted with another. There are thus alternative routes to peace, but these routes are not equally robust. The implications of this analysis are threefold. First, those interested in understanding why states restrict civil liberties and violate human rights must disaggregate their conceptions of system type and repression. Second, policymakers must adjust their approach to reducing state repression according to the type of authoritarian government they are confronted with. Third, advocates for human rights must accept that, in lieu of full democratization, alternatives exist.

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Introduction

Seeking a resolution to the United States’ current security problem, President George W. Bush declared a ‘war against tyranny’ during his second inaugural speech. The logic of his argument was straightforward. To Bush, individuals and organizations like Al-Qaeda lashed out against countries such as the United States because they were dissatisfied with the large amount of repression applied by the autocratic governments that they lived under. To secure peace (in the United States as well as abroad), the US President suggested that all autocratic governments needed to be eliminated and replaced with democratic systems. Only then would the world be safe.

While there are many aspects of this argument that are worthy of attention, one in particular is crucial, for it is directly relevant to public policy, NGO funding, academic research, and sociopolitical activism. Within the President’s statement, all governments identified as tyrannies (i.e. all autocratic political systems) would be equally threatening to citizens and consequently all tyrannies would need to be democratized at comparable rates. But, is this true? Are all tyrannies alike in their repressiveness and thus equally worthy of monitoring, discussion, intervention, and modification? The importance of
these questions could not be greater. Indeed, if some autocratic systems are more repressive than others, then the most coercive would present the greatest threats to domestic as well as international security, and these are the governments that would need to be identified, studied, and modified first. If, however, all autocratic regimes repressed their citizens at more or less comparable rates, then the strategy outlined by the US President would be legitimate.

Considering existing literature on political repression, it is clear that we simply do not know the answers to the questions raised above. In their assessment of state coercive behavior, most scholars do not differentiate between types of autocracy (Davenport, 1995b; Harff, 2003; Hibbs, 1973; Krain, 1997; Mitchell & McCormick, 1988). A few have explored variation in autocratic behavior (e.g. Poe & Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1996) but these investigations have been limited. For example, these efforts do not consider the full breadth of diversity within autocratic governments highlighted by different scholars (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1962; Geddes, 1999; Linz, 2000; Neumann, 1957; Wintrobe, 1998), they do not consider divergent hypotheses regarding exactly which type of autocratic systems are the most repressive, and they do not consider different types of repressive activity at the same time – gauging the robustness of the influence across measures.

When one does address the issue of how state repression varies across autocratic governments – something more consistently dealt with in qualitative and theoretical literature (Boudreau, 2004; Dallin & Breslauer, 1970; Linz, 2000) – major differences are identified. For example, within one argument (political insulation), repressive behavior emerges when autocratic leaders are isolated and have involved a smaller number of actors in the political process (e.g. personalist systems). In these situations, the likelihood of repressive behavior is increased as those inside the ruling clique attempt to protect themselves from those that do not have any institutional means to influence government policy/practice (Rummel, 1997). By contrast, in governments where authorities have involved more individuals/organizations (e.g. single-party governments), the likelihood of coercive behavior would be lower, for those in power are able to use alternative mechanisms of control to influence the population by ‘channeling’ them through established political institutions (Linz, 2000). This influences not only the magnitude but also the type of repression employed because, given the highly bureaucratic orientation of the more inclusive governments, they are more inclined to allow some enjoyment of civil liberties than other autocracies.

Concerning another argument (coercive expertise), it is suggested that within political systems where the agents of repression (i.e. the military) directly wield power, there is a higher likelihood that repressive behavior – especially violent activity – would be applied out of habit, familiarity, an impulse to meet specific organizational norms, and a desire to expand prestige in/control over the political system (Gurr, 1986). Finally, there are those that consider a third argument (post-Cold War pacification). Within this work, it is suggested that the positive influence of autocracy on repression is not constant over time. Specifically, it is argued that before the decline of communism and the hegemony of the Soviet Union, all autocracies may have used repressive behavior extensively (especially in single-party regimes which were largely associated with the political left). After this period, however, given the preeminence of the USA, democratic governments in the West, and international norms such as human rights, it is not believed that relationships would be stable over time. In
fact, in line with the ‘End of History’ thesis, it is possible that after 1989 all types of autocratic government diminished their use of repression (particularly those concerning the most violent forms of activity which have been the focus of the human rights movement).

Within this article, I investigate the influence of diverse types of autocracy on state repressive action – exploring the ‘tyrannical peace’. The article begins with a general overview of the literature, identifying definitions, theoretical orientations, and dominant findings. In the second section, I present different arguments about why and how autocracy influences repression. The data and methodological approach employed within the study are addressed in section three, followed by the statistical findings. As found, single-party regimes are the least repressive autocratic governments throughout the 1976–96 period, across forms of repression. Other types of autocracy influence repressive behavior but the impact varies by the type of repression and period of time under consideration. The implications of these findings are discussed in the conclusion.

Comprehending State Repression

The systematic study of human rights violation/state repression has progressed a great deal over the last thirty-five years (Davenport, 2007b). During this time, researchers have defined the subject under investigation and developed a reasonable theoretical framework for understanding why this behavior is applied. They have produced a rich body of empirical work to gauge the quality of the theories/hypotheses put forward. Each will be addressed below.

The Domain of Interest

Although the word ‘repression’ is highly evocative and widely used in academic circles as well as the diverse public forum, the exact meaning is not always readily apparent. Most within the study of conflict use the phrase to identify some form of coercive sociopolitical control used by political authorities against those within their territorial jurisdiction (Goldstein, 1978). This encompasses a wide variety of activities including domestic spying (e.g. physical and electronic surveillance as well as agents provocateurs), verbal and physical harassment, arrests, political banning (e.g. outlawing a party, type of action or belief), establishing curfews, acts of censorship (e.g. closing a newspaper), torture, disappearances, and mass killing.

Not all are highlighted simultaneously in existing literature. At present, two distinct groupings are generally explored. First, we have what are referred to as civil liberties restrictions. These involve state or state-affiliated limitations, such as arrests, banning, and curfews, being placed on expression, association, assembly, and beliefs (Davenport, 1995a,b, 1996, 2004; Hibbs, 1973). Second, we have what are referred to as personal integrity violations. These involve state or state-affiliated activities which target the integrity of the person (i.e. which directly threaten human life) such as torture and mass killing (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Harff, 2003; Krain, 1997; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999). The distinction between these two is important, for it has allowed us to explore some differences that exist between repressive strategies. Although it is not generally discussed, most do not appear to believe that the two forms of repression are identical. While both forms of repression attempt to influence the behavior and attitudes of those within the relevant territorial domain, there are important differences: for example, restrictions attempt to modify behavior/attitudes through constraining as well as channeling opportunities, whereas killing attempts to modify behavior/attitudes through eliminating actors. It is interesting

2 Davenport (1999) has initiated a third that combines the two, but this has not been widely adopted.
that almost all explanatory variables wield similar influences; this suggests that comparable processes underlie the two coercive strategies (Davenport, 2004).

**Frameworks and Findings**
For most in this area of research, the key to understanding why repression is used lies in comprehending the factors that influence the political leader’s decision calculus. Although varying in the degree of explicitness and sophistication with which this model is detailed, the basic explanation is simple enough. As designed, authorities weigh the ‘benefits’ of utilizing coercive action (i.e. what repression will facilitate/lead to) against the ‘costs’ (i.e. what repression will deplete/detract from). Simultaneously, they consider the availability of other alternatives (diverse ways of influencing sociopolitical thought and behavior) as well as the potential effectiveness of repressive effort. It is expected that when benefits exceed costs, no alternatives are available, and the probability of success is high, coercive behavior will be increased. If the costs exceed the benefits, alternatives are available, and the probability of success is low, however, then coercive behavior will be decreased or withdrawn completely.

Considering benefits such as political order (the elimination of domestic challenge) and coercive habituation (the continuation of repressive practices and norms related to this behavior), costs such as political legitimacy (the reduction of support for government leaders, policies, and institutions) and resource deletion (the expense for repressive agents, equipment, training, and the like), the existence of alternatives (e.g. normative as well as material influence), and the likelihood of success (e.g. past effectiveness and organizational preparedness), existing research has largely supported the existing approach rather well – albeit in a somewhat unbalanced fashion. Almost without exception, benefits increase repression while costs decrease it; comparatively little effort has been expended to investigate the impact of alternatives and the likelihood of success.

**Institutional Factors and the Domestic Democratic Peace**
While different components of the theoretical and empirical research on state repression are important, perhaps none is as crucial to the field as that concerning political institutions in general and political democracy in particular (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Davenport, 2007a; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Hibbs, 1973; Keith, 2002; Rummel, 1997). To date, the research on the influence of democracy on repression – the ‘domestic democratic peace’ – has been quite robust (e.g. Davenport, 1996, 2004, 2007a,b; Keith, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Across time, space, context, operationalization, and methodological techniques, scholars consistently identify that democracy decreases repression (e.g. Hibbs, 1973; Davenport, 1996, 2004; Keith, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Some research has challenged this argument, suggesting that there is an inverted-U relationship (Regan & Henderson, 2002). This research was rejected by Davenport & Armstrong (2004), however, who found that, although democracy decreased the amount of political discretion wielded by authorities, increased the capacity of citizens to punish rulers for undesirable activity, decreased the...
willingness of leaders to use repressive behavior, and provided an alternative mechanism for influencing society, these influences were not present until after a particular level of democracy ('threshold') had been passed. Below this threshold, all regimes were equally likely to engage in coercive behavior; above this threshold, a negative existed.

Implicit within existing work is the idea that different types of autocracy are equally likely to apply repressive behavior. Specifically, this work maintains that there are no systematic patterns among non-democratic regimes which reduce state coercion – a position consistent with many policymakers (including the current US President), numerous funding organizations, and popular opinion in the West.

Is this true? While not explicitly examined, prior research does suggest that it is not. For example, investigating the influence of diverse military characteristics on repressive behavior (e.g. their degree of control over the executive), several scholars find that these factors increase the likelihood that coercion would be applied (Davenport, 1995a; Mitchell & McCormick, 1988; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999). Similarly, Poe & Tate (1994), as well as the others affiliated with their research program (Keith, 1999, 2002), consistently report that governments run by the military and 'leftist' political authorities are more inclined to use repressive behavior. Also focusing on structural characteristics and ideological orientation (albeit an exclusively monetary one), Pion-Berlin (1989) finds that authoritarian governments advancing monetary policies directed toward export and growth are more inclined to use coercion.

Following from this work, we would not expect repression to be comparably applied across all types of autocracy. Indeed, this research leads us to focus on some types more than others in our efforts to understand why human rights violations occur.

Institutional Factors and the Tyrannical Peace

While useful for advancing our understanding of how autocracy influences repression, the quantitative literature discussed above has been limited. First, only a few studies explicitly focus on the topic. Second, although existing research highlights some aspects of autocracy (e.g. the influence of the military and the ideological orientation of the government), others are neglected. For example, no research explicitly attempts to juxtapose personalist, single-party, and military governments against one another – the most consistently identified autocratic systems, differentiated by the number of political actors involved in the process or the degree to which 'limited' pluralism exists.

Such a limitation does not plague the qualitative literature on autocracy and state repression (e.g. Walter, 1969; Dallin & Breslauer, 1970; Boudreau, 2004). Indeed, this work provides a rich foundation upon which one can build an empirical analysis. At the same time, this research also reveals a very different explanation for why particular institutional configurations impact state repression. As designed, I focus on three general propositions about why repression might vary across different types of autocracy. These are addressed below.

Limited Pluralism and Political Control

Perhaps the most pervasive argument about why autocratic governments use repressive behavior concerns the fact that leaders within these political systems generally lack alternative mechanisms of influence other than coercion (Arendt, 1951; Geddes, 1999; Linz, 2000; Rummel, 1997). This follows directly from arguments concerning political democracy, which has frequently served as the descriptive opposite of autocratic governments (Sartori, 1987). In democratic political systems, it is typically argued that authorities are less inclined to engage in repression because they
are able to use other means. For example, by allowing individuals and organizations to express themselves within the existing political system (through parties, lobbying and electoral participation), democratic governments are able to diminish the need for repressive behavior. Implicit here is the belief that coercion is a policy authorities will use unless they are provided with a viable alternative for sociopolitical control. This relates back to the standard decision calculus used within the repression literature whereby political leaders assess the relative costs and benefits associated with repression, the availability of other options, and the likelihood of success. Although alternatives are simply part of this decision calculus, I assume that, given the possibility of generating/exacerbating resistance to coercive behavior (both within and outside of the country), this factor carries a major influence.

While it is commonly believed that autocracies uniformly lack alternative mechanisms of sociopolitical control, researchers of these governments are quick to point out that this is not the case. Indeed, some have argued that autocratic governments vary significantly in this regard. For instance, numerous scholars maintain that personalist governments (e.g. Saddam Hussein in Iraq from 1979 to 2003) are the most repressive of all autocratic systems because they are the most isolated politically (Linz, 2000; Rummel, 1997; Walter, 1969); indeed, these political systems are structured in such a way that the leader and the ruling clique represent the only wielders of power within the government; without this access, there is no influence and in this tentative situation, repression would be used to proactively eliminate challengers. Presumably, this argument would also apply to hybrid regimes that prominently feature personalism with other types of autocracy: for example, with single-party regimes like Torrijos in Panama (1968–81) or with single-party and military regimes like Asad in Syria.

In contrast, single-party governments and the hybrids prominently featuring this characteristic would be the least repressive of all autocracies because they are the least insulated politically (Geddes, 1999). Although one might question the degree to which single-parties do or do not facilitate the expression of grievances and promote an alternative mechanism of sociopolitical control, it is clear that, compared with personalist systems, they do provide some venue within which discussion/aspirations/activism can take place – in a sense, it may be the only ‘show in town’, but at least there is a show. This ‘channeling’ is essential because without it political authorities are not provided with a non-coercive means of influence, and repression would be expected.

Somewhere between the two extremes, but closer to personalist systems, are military governments and the hybrids featuring this system. In this context, one could argue that the number of salient political actors and channels would be greater than in personalist governments, but given the size of most juntas, the differences are minimal. In addition to this, since military organizations thrive on deference to authority and chains of command, I do not believe that these political systems will offer many opportunities for individuals/organizations to get involved politically, thereby reducing the necessity for repression. What is offered by these governments reveals a somewhat different logic. This is addressed below.

Now, I do not expect only the type of autocracy to have an impact on the likelihood of repressive behavior but also its form. For example, I anticipate that, given the importance of bureaucracy and a concern with legality, single-party governments would be less likely to restrict civil liberties when they repress. This allows citizens to enjoy diverse rights but within the constraints fixed by the dominant political actor. In contrast, personalist and military governments are much more
likely to restrict civil liberties because they are less interested in as well as less able to ‘channel’ participation – lacking an effective political machine to do so.

Coercive Expertise
Drawing upon the argument that the agents of repression and not the insulated nature of political authorities hold the key to understanding variation within the repressive practices of autocratic governments (Dahl, 1966; Dallin & Breslauer, 1970; Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1962), I consider what has been perhaps the most controversial argument. Two variations are discussed.

Training and Instrumentalism Within one view, what is commonly referred to as ‘bureaucratic inertia’ or the ‘law of the instrument’, repression is applied when either those who specifically enact these policies are directly in power (i.e. coercive agents) or wield significant influence over those in power. The role of the coercive agents influences the application of coercion because these actors are the most familiar with what is involved when relevant behavior is used, and they are the ones that benefit the most from its application through enhanced resources, status, and fulfillment of organizational objectives (pursuing political order). Additionally, they decrease the amount of uncertainty about relevant activity and increase the amount of confidence about successful application. Simultaneously, the actors most familiar with repression would be the least likely to pursue or facilitate the use of alternative mechanisms of influence, for this would decrease their involvement, access to resources, and fulfillment of organizational objectives. As a consequence, one would expect that, within political systems where the presence of the military was enhanced, repression would be increased and, in part, those forms of repression that are most familiar to the armed forces – violations of personal integrity such as torture, disappearance, and mass killing.

There are those that disagree with this position. Countering this argument, others have noted that the armed forces tend to shy away from their area of expertise and implementing repressive behavior. Indeed, the hesitancy of the ‘professional soldier’ to interfere in domestic politics because of organizational norms is a constant theme in older research (Huntington, 1957; Perlmutter & Bennett, 1980), persisting up to the present (Linz, 2000).

Skills and Necessity The second variant of the coercive expertise argument concerns the difference between latent and manifest conceptions of power. As discussed above, while existing literature on repression consistently highlights costs and benefits, it tends to ignore issues such as need. This is relevant to the current discussion, for it is possible that military governments use repressive behavior less frequently than other autocratic regimes (especially more violent forms) because they do not have to. In these contexts, overt manifestations of coercive power are less necessary, for such power is signaled by the presence of the military itself. Essentially, when the military wields an influence over society, citizens know that the government could and is well prepared to use repressive behavior – this links back to the older idea of ‘coercive capacity’. As a result, discrete applications of repression would generally be diminished when military leaders were in power relative to other autocratic governments, and this would be reflected in measures that identify state applications of coercion.5

Post-Cold War Pacification
The third, and final, argument addressed by this research concerns temporal variation. As

5 I am not arguing that military governments have more ‘power’ than non-military governments. Rather, I am arguing that the actual and potential uses of force are generally conflated with one another, missing the very important distinction made above.
conceived, the diverse arguments about how autocracy influences repressive behavior (discussed above) assume that relationships are stable over time. This is not, however, reflective of existing literature or mass opinion.

For example, many have argued that, between 1948 and 1989, political dynamics around the world were influenced (if not wholly determined) by Cold War competition between the USA and the USSR (Appy, 2000). Within the context of this international conflict, it is generally believed that all governments (regardless of political affiliation) used higher levels of repressive activity as they played their role in the larger battle for global supremacy and endeavored to maintain order within their territorial jurisdiction (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). After the demise of the Soviet Union (in 1989), however, it is also believed that, as political leaders around the world sought to improve their relationships with the remaining hegemon (the USA), acknowledging that the dominant norm of the time would be liberalization (relaxed repression) as opposed to human rights violation and political order, repressive behavior would decrease, regardless of regime type.

As with the other hypotheses, there are some objections to this argument. First, it is possible that the Cold War suppressed the ability of pluralism as well as coercive expertise and that before 1989 there would be no impact on repressive behavior from these factors. Subject to international dynamics, the importance of more local-level factors would vanish (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995: 72). After the Cold War, the influence would be revealed. Second, it can be argued that, after the Cold War, repression increased as essentially all autocratic governments (i.e. ‘illegitimate’ political systems) attempted to stay in power amidst a hostile international environment. Here, the weight of the democratic monopoly on political legitimacy took a toll but in a direction not normally suggested. Third, it is possible that, regardless of what happened at the international level, autocratic regimes repressed at levels they always had. Fourth, it is possible that only certain forms of repression would be influenced. For example, with the growth and acceptance of the human rights movement, most political leaders appeared to acknowledge (in international agreements and public statements) that most egregious forms of repressive activity were not acceptable. In comparison, no such declarations were made about less violent forms of state coercion. As a consequence, we would expect civil liberties restrictions to be less impacted by the Cold War relative to personal integrity violations.

Research Design

Within this study, I employ numerous variables to examine the topic of interest – some used quite frequently in existing research but others less so. Beginning with the dependent variable (repression), I then move to discuss the principal independent variable of interest (types of authoritarianism), and the other variables generally included within a model of state repression. Following this, I briefly address the methodological technique employed before discussing the results.

State Repressive Action

In measuring this behavior, I sought to address several issues at once. First, I wanted to use indicators that covered a relatively large number of countries and over time. Second, I wanted to use indicators that addressed the diversity of state repressive behavior. It is possible that certain forms of authoritarianism are important
for only certain forms of state repression. As I argued earlier (2004: 539), some states kill, some restrict, some kill and restrict, and some do neither; in this work, I attempt to help discover what accounts for the variation. Third, I was interested in using variables that are generally considered valid and reliable. Fourth, I wanted to consider diverse types of repression in order to explore the possibility that different processes of state coercion existed.

In line with prior research, two different indicators of repression are employed. The first, involves the civil liberties restriction measure created by Freedom House (Karatnycky, 1999: 546). The second involves the political terror measure provided by Poe & Tate (1994), updated through 1996. Both of these indicators have been discussed numerous times with regard to their validity and reliability and thus I will not go into too much detail here (for Freedom House, see Bollen, 1986: 85–86; for the Political Terror Scale measure from Poe & Tate [1994], see Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999).

**Type of Authoritarianism**

To identify the types of autocracy identified above, I use data compiled by Geddes (1999). This information is available up to 1996, constraining the time period under investigation. Within this database, Geddes provides information on the type of regime as well as the beginning and end of the specific form of government. Specifically, Geddes identifies seven distinct categories of authoritarian governments:

1. **Personalist regimes** (e.g. Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire/Congo 1965–97; Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines 1972–86; Augusto Pinochet in Chile 1973–89; Jean Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier in Haiti 1976–86; Saddam Hussein in Iraq 1979–2003);
2. **Personalist hybrids** (i.e. personalist-military regimes [e.g. Niger 1974–93]; and personalist-single-party regimes [e.g. Panama 1968–81]);
3. **Military regimes** (e.g. Yemen 1962–78; Thailand 1976–88; Nigeria 1983–1993);
4. **Military hybrids** (i.e. military-personalist regimes [e.g. Chile 1973–89] and military-single-party regimes [e.g. Rwanda 1973–94]);
5. **Single-party regimes** (e.g. Soviet Union 1917–91; Nicaragua 1979–90);
6. **Single-party hybrids** (i.e. single-party-personalist regimes [e.g. Cuba 1959 to the present, Iraq 1968–79] and single-party-military regimes [e.g. Congo 1968–92]);
7. **Complex hybrids**: Single-party-personalist-military regimes (e.g. Egypt 1952–96).8

As defined, ‘personalist’ regimes are those where ‘access to political office and the fruits of office are held by an individual leader’ (Geddes, 1999: 4). In contrast, military regimes are those where a ‘group of officers decides who rules and influences policy’ (Geddes, 1999: 4).9 Finally, ‘single-party’ regimes are those where ‘access to political office and policy control [are] dominated by one party, though other parties may legally exist and compete in elections’ (Geddes 1999: 4).10 For a thorough discussion of how these data were compiled, the decision rules that were employed, and the diverse problems encountered while engaging in this effort, I refer individuals to the Geddes article and codebook.

Viewing the two indicators across diverse types of autocracy, I find important differences between types of government. For example, personalist, military-personalist,
single-party-personalist or military\textsuperscript{11} and military-personalist-single-party governments tend to restrict civil liberties (at median level 6) more than military and single-party governments (at median level 5). As expected, non-autocracies (the baseline – not shown) are lower in their restrictions of civil liberties compared to all autocratic regimes (at median level 3). This provides preliminary support for the limited pluralism and coercive expertise arguments. Similar to the previous repressive category, we see that personalist, military-personalist, and military-personalist-single-party governments violate personal integrity more than others but, differing from the previous category, we

\textsuperscript{11} The dominant characteristic is listed first.
also see that single-party and military governments have comparable means (at median level 3 as well). Interestingly, non-autocracies (not shown) have the lowest median but single-party-personalist or military governments are also low as well (at level 2).

Drawing upon the standard model used within the human rights violation/repression literature, I include several other variables in the statistical model. For example, to measure political dissent, I employ three indicators widely found within the literature: violent dissent (i.e. riots and guerilla warfare) as operationalized by Banks (2001), as well as civil and interstate war as measured by the Correlates of War project (Small & Singer, 1982). Focusing on political institutions, I employ a four-point measure of democracy which highlights ‘Executive Constraints’ provided by Gurr (1974) and associates. This indicator ‘refers to the extent of institutionized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any “accountability groups”’ (Marshall & Jaggers, 2001: 21). As the authors state, in the final analysis, ‘the concern [of the constraints measure] is . . . with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process’ (Marshall & Jaggers, 2001: 21). Indeed, the only distinctive characteristic of this measure, as drawn from most discussions of veto, is the fact that accountability groups can exist both within government and outside of it.

In addition to the factors identified above, I pay attention to three other factors which are also standard in the literature: e.g. the size of the total population, GNP per capita, and the leftist orientation of the regime. All are provided by the Poe & Tate (1994) research project – updated to 1996. The first two are frequently associated with modernization theories; greater population and poverty increase socio-economic stress, which in turn increases the perceived need for political control. The third variable allows me to assess the degree to which repressiveness is associated with what states believe. Argued by a wide assortment of individuals, such as Pion-Berlin (1989) and Rummel (1997), it is expected that political belief systems that place less emphasis on individuals than collectives would be more inclined to use repression than if these priorities were reversed. As designed, the Poe and Tate measure identified those regimes that maintain a collective orientation.

Methodological Technique
Given the structure of the dependent variables (rank-ordered, ordinal measures), in order to investigate the impact of authoritarianism on state repression, I employ an ordered-logit model with robust standard errors (Long, 1997). This approach deviates from much of the literature which normally employs some form of OLS regression, but, as Richards (1999) and others identify, it is inappropriate to use this technique when the data do not conform to specific characteristics. The robust standard errors allow me to control for the fact that observations are independent across countries but not within them. Given the difficulty with interpreting coefficients, I provide what is a rather conventional approach. Specifically, I identify the most likely category of repression predicted by a variable when it is moved from its minimum to its maximum, holding other variables at their medians.

Examination
As discussed above, two distinct measures of state repression are employed within this
analysis to explore the robustness of the statistical analysis. I begin with Freedom House’s measure of civil liberties restriction and then move to Poe & Tate’s indicator of Personal Integrity Violations.

**Civil Liberties Restriction**

According to the results, the basic model (Table I, Model 1) is generally consistent with prior research. Considering civil liberties restriction as the dependent variable, executive constraints and GNP per capita are negative in their effect, with the latter wielding the larger influence as gauged by the predicted change in repression (not displayed). Governments are less likely to restrict their citizen’s civil liberties when the controls placed on the executive are greater and the economy is well off. In contrast, but again in line with existing literature, restrictions are increased by violent dissent, civil war, interstate war, lagged repression, and the leftist orientation of the government. As gauged by the change in predicted category (not shown), the variables associated with conflict do not wield much of an influence. When these variables are at their minimum or their maximum, repression is likely in category 5 – all else held constant. In contrast, the influence of lagged repression is much greater. At its minimum value in the previous year, subsequent repression is generally quite low, and, at its maximum value in the previous year, subsequent repression is increased dramatically. Interestingly, I find that governments are just as likely to repress if the regime is leftist in orientation as they would be if they were not. This represents a very different conclusion from work generally concerned with personal integrity.

Incorporating the different types of autocracy into the analysis (Table I, Model 2), I find that the results of the basic model generally hold with minor changes but that the number of cases correctly predicted decreases slightly. Most important for this research, I find that single-parties and military governments decrease civil liberties restriction relative to non-autocracies as the baseline. The former supports the limited pluralism hypothesis; the latter supports the skills and necessity variant of the coercive expertise argument. Interestingly, personalist governments have no statistically significant influence on restrictions. There is thus no consistent finding derived from a consideration of governments associated with Muhammad Daoud in Afghanistan during his last two years in office (1976–78), Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1976–89), Jean Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier in Haiti (1976–1986), Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso (1983–87) or Saddam Hussein in Iraq (1979–96). Now, this is not to say that there was no repression in these countries; rather, it is to say that there was just as likely to be high applications of repression in these governments as low applications. Also interesting, none of the hybrid regimes (where diverse types of autocracy are considered in tandem) has an impact on repressive activity (at least not the form examined here). There are therefore no consistent repressive applications by regimes in Panama, 1968–81 (personalist-single-party), Rwanda, 1973–94 (military-single-party) or Iraq, 1968–79 (single-party-personalist).

Of course, the substantive importance of regime type on repression is separate from the issue of which form of autocracy is more effective at reducing state coercion. As designed, the model reported above uses democracies as the baseline. While extremely important because these results tell us about the relative importance of autocratic type compared with the least repressive form of government, these results do not allow us to understand how the different autocracies stack up against one

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14 Democracies were selected as the baseline for several reasons. First, when most think of explanatory factors that reduce repression, democracy is the one that comes to mind most frequently. Second, it is generally the case that policymakers, activists, and scholars would prefer to move governments to full democracy, as democracies are believed to be the most pacific. Given that it may not be possible for all governments to be democratic in the short term, but individuals may still wish to reduce state coercion, it is important to consider alternatives relative to the impact of democracy. This said, shifts in the baseline category do not substantively alter the results.
another. For this, I estimate pairwise differences between the coefficients derived from Model 2 (Table II). From this test, I find that military governments are lower in their applications of repression relative to personalist and two hybrids, which feature military and/or personalist characteristics prominently (single-party-military or personalist and military-personalist-single-party governments). This supports the training and instrumentalist version of the coercive expertise argument.

Examining civil liberties practices before and after 1989 (Table I, Model 3), I do find a post-Cold War effect. While the military governments are stable in their negative influence across time and the post-Cold War dummy is statistically insignificant, revealing that there is no generally pacifying influence associated with the post-1989 period, results disclose that, after 1989, single-party regimes reduce their overall level of restriction on association, assembly, speech, and religion but that they are not significantly less repressive before this time. Since I control for leftist political orientation (a statistically positive influence), which essentially disappears in its impact during the post-1989 period, this finding suggests that there is something

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I. Civil Liberties Ordered-Logit Models</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties, ( t=2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties, ( t=3 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties, ( t=4 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties, ( t=5 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties, ( t=6 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties, ( t=7 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(GNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent dissent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party (mil or pers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist-SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (&gt;89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military x Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist x Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party-military or personalist x Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party x Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist-single party x Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Correctly predicted</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Main entries are ordered logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
N = 2,602.
* p < 0.05, two-sided.
specific about single-party governments beyond ideological orientation that influences repression. This said, prior to 1989, there is nothing particular about this form of autocracy; they are just as likely to repress as have no coercive activity.  

This may be surprising to many, as they believe that single-party governments have been almost exclusively leftist in orientation over the relevant period, but this is not the case. Pearson correlation coefficients reveal that leftist political orientation is associated with single-party governments more than the other types of autocracy but only at a value of +.33. Of the others, single-military or personalist systems are +.20, military-personalist-single-party systems are +.10, personalist systems are +.01, military governments are –.05, and military-personalist systems are –.003.

Table II. Pairwise Differences Between Autocracy Coefficients

(a) Table I, Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Military-personalist</th>
<th>Personalist</th>
<th>Single-party military or personalist</th>
<th>Single-party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist</td>
<td>-0.449</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>-0.578*</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.656)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party military or personalist</td>
<td>-0.66*</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.529)</td>
<td>(0.753)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party</td>
<td>-0.504</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.847)</td>
<td>(0.705)</td>
<td>(0.531)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist-single-party</td>
<td>-0.714*</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.641)</td>
<td>(0.871)</td>
<td>(0.453)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Table III, Model 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Military-personalist</th>
<th>Personalist</th>
<th>Single-party military or personalist</th>
<th>Single-party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.569)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.531)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party military or personalist</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.467)</td>
<td>(0.802)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party</td>
<td>0.612*</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist-single-party</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
<td>-0.532*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.794)</td>
<td>(0.752)</td>
<td>(0.311)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05, main entries are b_{column}-b_{row}, p-values in parentheses.

Personal Integrity Violations

When the analysis moves to consider state-sponsored activities such as torture, disappearance, and mass killing, results are mixed. For example, investigating the basic model (Table III, Model 4), executive constraints and GNP again decrease repression – with both wielding about the same influence as gauged by the change in predicted categories (not shown). Similar to earlier findings, personal integrity violations are increased by violent dissent, interstate as well as civil war, and lagged repression; again, the last wields the greatest influence on the dependent variable,
followed by civil war, violent dissent, and interstate war. Differing from the previous analysis, leftist political orientation is statistically insignificant. Leftist governments are just as likely as non-leftist governments to torture, disappear, and kill their citizens.

Comparable to the model of civil liberties restriction, when variables identifying different types of autocracy are incorporated into the model (Table III, Model 5), the remaining variables in the model are essentially the same in terms of their causal influence; only one autocratic characteristic has a statistically significant influence (single-party governments) and the number of cases correctly predicted increases, which bolsters my faith in the empirical finding. Directly comparable to the earlier analysis, single-party autocracies negatively influence state repression, further supporting the argument that increasing the degree of pluralism and ‘channeling’ political engagement, even amidst an authoritarian context, tends to reduce state repression.

Considering pairwise differences between autocracies (Table II), the results confirm the patterns identified above. In the context of personal integrity violations, military governments are more likely to repress than single-
party governments. In addition to this, results disclose that military hybrids are also more likely to torture and kill their citizens, compared with single-party governments.

Considering the importance of the Cold War (Table II, Model 6), I find that, except for single-party governments which are still statistically significant and negative in their influence, distinct forms of autocracy were just as likely to torture, disappear, and kill after 1989 as they were before. Differing from the investigation of civil liberties, the Cold War dummy is statistically significant, suggesting that, after the Cold War, governments were generally more likely to violate personal integrity. My faith in the results is bolstered by the fact that the incorporation of both autocratic categories and the temporal interactions increases the number of cases correctly predicted.

How does one reconcile the different results for military governments across the two models above? It seems reasonable to suggest that these political systems reduce civil liberties restrictions because they tend to avoid involving themselves with the political processes which are normally responsible for these repressive activities (i.e. legislatures and courts). In fact, my results show that military governments are systematically more likely to relax these coercive activities. In contrast, political systems controlled by the armed forces are more inclined to use repressive techniques which are more directly within the realm of their area of expertise – physical violence.

**Conclusion**

This study was inspired by an apparent disjuncture that existed within the policy community and academic literature between those who lumped together different types of autocracy (arguing that all use state repression at comparable levels) and those who disaggregated autocracy (arguing that different types use repression at different rates and for different reasons). From an analysis of 137 countries from 1976 to 1996, I find that single-party governments are consistently the least repressive form of autocracy: that is, they are less likely to restrict civil liberties and violate personal integrity. In comparison, military governments are less repressive than other forms of autocracy when civil liberties restrictions are considered, but they are more repressive than other forms of autocracy when violent activities such as torture and mass killing are considered. Personalist systems are less likely to restrict civil liberties, but this is only after the Cold War has ended – a period in which more lethal forms of state repression are increased.

From this analysis, I conclude that there is a ‘tyrannical peace’, in that single-party governments possess some of the characteristics of democracies that reduce state repression, incorporating a greater proportion of the population into the political process. I should make clear that I am not suggesting that these autocratic regimes (such as single-party governments) should not be democratized, for this entails an even greater reduction in repressive behavior. Rather, I am acknowledging that existing policymakers, academic researchers, and human rights activists need to take notice of the fact that not all autocratic regimes are alike in their repressive practices, and thus they do not all threaten domestic (and/or international) peace to the same degree. Additionally, I acknowledge that the ‘tyrannical peace’ discussed in this article is highly specific in terms of the type of autocratic government being discussed as well as the form of repressive behavior to which it applies.

What are the implications of this study? Essentially, there are three, involving academic research, public policy, and sociopolitical advocacy. Each will be addressed in turn.

For research, the implications are clear: in the future, there must be an effort extended to disaggregate regime type so that we can understand the circumstances under which civil liberties are restricted and human rights
are violated. It is incorrect to treat all autocratic governments in the same manner. The work initiated here is only a first step. Other issues require attention. For example, it is worthwhile to ask what is the least coercive trajectory of regime change as governments move from the most autocratic to democratic? Are democratic or tyrannical paths to peace more susceptible to reversal (i.e. increased repressiveness) and under what circumstances? What is the best way to initiate a tyrannical path to peace? Do the patterns identified in this analysis extend beyond the late 1990s? Are there geographic factors involved with state–dissident interaction (Davenport & Stam, 2003; Ron, 2003)? All of these issues are worthy of analysis.

This study also has implications for public policy. Recently, President George W. Bush suggested that the USA should engage in a war (i.e. intervention and invasion) against all autocracies in an effort to eliminate state repression which provoked the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. If different types of autocracy engage in varying levels of repressive behavior, however, then this argument and the policy associated with it are flawed. Indeed, by disregarding regime-specific differences in repression, such a position might ignore alternative paths to domestic peace and it might waste resources as well as human life. This is precisely the case within this research. From the results of a period ending five years before 9/11, it seems reasonable to suggest that single-party governments should be targeted last by relevant interventionist policies, whereas military governments (e.g. Ghana between 1972 and 1979 or Guatemala between 1970 and 1985) and hybrids which combine military, personalist, and single-party governments (such as the Stroessner regime in Paraguay from 1954 to 1993) should be targeted first – especially if individuals are interested in the most egregious forms of state repression. All other autocratic regimes would fall between these two extremes. As a result, the ‘tyrannical peace’ significantly challenges the direction of current US policy, which tends to ignore the subtleties identified within this work.

Finally, there are important implications of this research for advocacy. From the analysis reported here, support is provided for an argument that human rights violations are decreased by promoting specific forms of autocracy. This is a very different approach from what is usually advocated in the human rights community. At the same time, as many around the world suffer from extensive amounts of state repression, and the governments that they live under have not been able to move toward democratic government with the peace that this brings, it does provide an alternative way to diminish political bans, instances of censorship, torture, disappearances, political imprisonment, and mass killing by some non-trivial amount — no small feat, by any means. By stating this, I, of course, am not suggesting that we simply give ‘autocracy a chance’. Rather, I am suggesting that those concerned with human rights should strive to promote the most pacific solution to the problem of state repression while being cognizant of the fact that not all solutions are equally possible within all situations. Toward this end, if the best that one could do is establish and support a single-party autocratic government in the hopes that this type of autocracy will reduce human rights violations (until a shift to full democracy can be made in the future [if at all]), it is clearly the case from the research reported here that one could do much worse.

This said, the complexity of the research presented here for activists is compounded when we consider research about the durability of autocratic systems. For example, addressing the work of Geddes (1999), we would be led to reflect on whether we should recommend single-party governments as one remedy for human rights violations if it means that individuals live under less repression but
for longer periods of time? Opinions on this issue would be highly contentious, but, given the rarity of democratic change and the immediacy of saving human life, it is something that is likely worthy of additional consideration. Indeed, in many respects, this may be one of the most important issues that we can address.

References


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